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ABSTRACT
Today, AI is being increasingly used to help human experts make
decisions in high-stakes scenarios. In these scenarios, full automa-
tion is often undesirable, not only due to the significance of the
outcome, but also because human experts can draw on their domain
knowledge complementary to the model’s to ensure task success.
We refer to these scenarios as AI-assisted decision making, where
the individual strengths of the human and the AI come together
to optimize the joint decision outcome. A key to their success is
to appropriately calibrate human trust in the AI on a case-by-case
basis; knowing when to trust or distrust the AI allows the human
expert to appropriately apply their knowledge, improving decision
outcomes in cases where the model is likely to perform poorly. This
research conducts a case study of AI-assisted decision making in
which humans and AI have comparable performance alone, and ex-
plores whether features that reveal case-specific model information
can calibrate trust and improve the joint performance of the hu-
man and AI. Specifically, we study the effect of showing confidence
score and local explanation for a particular prediction. Through
two human experiments, we show that confidence score can help
calibrate people’s trust in an AI model, but trust calibration alone is
not sufficient to improve AI-assisted decision making, which may
also depend on whether the human can bring in enough unique
knowledge to complement the AI’s errors. We also highlight the
problems in using local explanation for AI-assisted decision mak-
ing scenarios and invite the research community to explore new
approaches to explainability for calibrating human trust in AI.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, especially Machine Learn-
ing (ML), have become ubiquitous and are increasingly used in a
wide range of tasks. While algorithms can perform impressively, in
many situations full delegation to ML models is not desired because
their probabilistic nature means that there is never a guarantee
of correctness for a particular decision. Furthermore, ML models
are only as accurate as the historical data used to train them, and
this data could suffer from input error, unknown flaws, and biases.
ML models can assist human decision-makers to produce a joint
decision outcome that is hopefully better than what could be pro-
duced by either the model or human alone. Ultimately however,
humans would be responsible for the decisions made. Therefore
ML decision-support applications should be developed not only
with the goal of high performance, safety and fairness, but also
allowing the decision-maker to understand the predictions made by
the model. This is especially important for decision-making in high-
stakes situations affecting human lives such as medical diagnosis,
law enforcement, and financial investment.
A key to success in AI-assisted decision making is to form a cor-
rect mental model of the model’s error boundaries [2]. That is, the
decision-makers need to know when to trust or distrust the model’s
recommendations. If they mistakenly follow the model’s recom-
mendations at times when it is likely to err, the decision outcome
would suffer, and catastrophic failures could happen in high-stakes
decisions. Many have called out the challenges for humans to form
a clear mental model of an AI, since opaque, "black-box" models are
increasingly used. Furthermore, by exclusively focusing on opti-
mizing model performance, developers of AI systems often neglect
the system users’ needs for developing a good mental model of
the AI’s error boundaries. For example, frequently updating the AI
algorithm may cause confusion to the human decision-maker, who
may accept or reject the AI’s recommendations at a wrong time,
even if the algorithm’s overall performance improved [2].
To help people develop a mental model of an ML model’s error
boundaries means to correctly calibrate trust on a case-by-case basis.
We emphasize that this goal is distinct from enhancing trust in AI.
For example, while research repeatedly demonstrates that providing
high-performance indicators of an AI system, such as showing high
accuracy scores, could enhance people’s trust and acceptance of the
system [17, 30, 32], they may not help people distinguish cases they
can trust from those they should not. Meanwhile, ML is probabilistic
and the probability of each single prediction can be indicated by a
confidence score. In other words, the confidence scores reflect the
chances that the AI is correct. Therefore, to optimize for the joint
decisions, in theory people should rely on the AI in cases where it
has high confidence, and use their own judgment in cases where
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it has low confidence. However, in practice, we know little about
how confidence scores are perceived by people, or how they impact
human trust and actions in AI-assisted decisions.
To improve people’s distrust in ML models, many considered the
importance of transparency by providing explanations for the ML
model [4, 9, 28]. In particular, local explanations that explain the
rationale for a single prediction (in contrast to global explanations
describing the overall logic of the model) are recommended to help
people judge whether to trust a model on a case-by-case basis [28].
For example, many local explanation techniques explain a predic-
tion by how each attribute of the case contributes to the model’s
prediction [19, 28]. It is possible that in low-certainty cases none of
the features stands out to make strong contributions. So the expla-
nation may appear ambivalent, thus alarming people to distrust the
prediction. While such a motivation to help people calibrate trust
underlies the development of local explanation techniques, to the
best of our knowledge, this assumption has not been empirically
tested in the context of AI-assisted decision making.
In this paper, we conduct a case study of AI-assisted decision-
making and examine the impact of information designs that re-
veal case-specific model information, including confidence score
and local explanation, on people’s trust in the AI and the decision
outcome. We explored two types of AI-assisted decision-making
scenarios. One where the AI gave direct recommendation, and the
other where the decision-maker had to choose whether to delegate
the decision without seeing the AI’s prediction, the latter of which
represents a stricter test of trust. We designed the study in a way
to have the human decision-makers performing comparably to the
AI, and also explored a situation where the humans know they
had more domain knowledge than the AI. In contrast, prior works
studying AI-assisted decision-making often used setups where hu-
mans’ decision performance was significantly inferior than the
model’s [17, 30], which would by default reward people to rely
on the AI. While such a setup is appropriate for studying how to
enhance trust in AI, our focus is to study the calibration of trust
for cases where the AI has high or low certainty. This paper makes
the following contribution:
• We highlight the problem of trust calibration in AI at a
prediction specific level, which is especially important to the
success of AI-assisted decision-making.
• Wedemonstrate that showing prediction specific confidence
information could support trust calibration, even in situa-
tions where the human has to blindly delegate the decision
to the AI. However, whether trust calibration could translate
into improved joint decision outcome may depend on other
factors, such as whether the human can bring in a unique
set of knowledge that complements the AI’s errors. We con-
sider the concept of error boundary alignment between the
human and the AI, and its implication for studying different
AI-assisted decision making scenarios.
• We show that local, prediction specific explanations may
not be able to create a perceivable effect for trust calibration,
even though theywere theoretically motivated for such tasks.
We discuss the limitations of the explanation design we used,
and future directions for developing explanations that can
better support trust calibration.
2 RELATEDWORK
The concept of trust has its roots in relationships between humans,
reflected in many aspects of collaborative behaviors with others
such as willingness to depend, give information and make pur-
chase [12, 21]. Trust has been widely studied in human-computer
and human-machine interaction since users’ decisions to continue
using a system or accept output from a machine are highly trust-
dependant behaviors [18, 25]. Very recently, understanding trust
in interaction with ML systems has sparked much interest across
disciplines, driven by the rapidly growing adoption of ML technolo-
gies. On the one hand, trust in ML systems can be seen as a case
for trust in algorithmic systems. Decades of research on this topic
yielded complex insights on humans’ inclination to trust algorithms
and what factors impact the trust. For example, while some studies
found an "algorithm aversion" where people stop trusting algo-
rithms after seeing mistakes [7], others found the reverse tendency
of "automation bias" with which people overly rely on delegation
to algorithms [6]. On the other hand, ML systems present some
unique challenges for fostering trust. One is their challenge for
scrutablity, especially given the increasing usage of "black box"
ML models such as neural networks. Another challenge is their
inherent uncertainty, since a ML system can make mistakes in its
prediction based on learned patterns, and such uncertainty often
cannot be fully captured before deployment using testing methods.
While many emphasized the requisite of transparency for trust-
ing AI [9, 28], several recent empirical studies found little evidence
that the level of transparency has significant impact on people’s
willingness to trust a ML system, whether by using a directly
interpretable model, allowing user to inspect the model behav-
ior, showing explanation or reducing the number of features pre-
sented [5, 16, 27, 29]. Many reasons could have contributed to this
lack of effect. One is the complex mechanism driving trusting be-
haviors. According to theories of trust [6, 12, 15], trusting behaviors
such as adopting suggestions are not only driven by a more posi-
tive perception of the trustee but also other factors such as one’s
disposition to trust and situation awareness. In fact, several studies
suggest that overloading users with information about the system
could potentially harm people’s situation awareness and lead to
worse performance or decision-making outcome [6, 27, 29].
Perhaps more critically, the premise that transparency or show-
ing information to faithfully reflect the model’s behavior should
enhance trust is questionable, because enhancing trust for an infe-
rior model is deceiving. Instead, in this paper we focus on the goal
of calibrating trust, to help people correctly distinguish situations
to trust or distrust an AI. While the concept of trust calibration
has been studied for automation [13, 18, 20, 26], as to prevent both
automation aversion and automation bias, it is not well understood
in the context of AI systems. In one relevant study [8], Dodge et al.
compared the effect of different explanation methods for calibrating
perceived fairness of MLmodels, i.e. distinguishing between statisti-
cally fair and unfair models. They found that local explanations, by
highlighting unfair features used for individual predictions, appear
to be more alarming than global explanations when used to explain
an unfair model’s decisions, and thus more effective in calibrating
people’s fairness judgment of ML models. Different from Dodge et
al., we explore the effect of local explanation on calibrating trust for
Effect of Confidence and Explanation on Accuracy and Trust Calibration in AI-Assisted Decision Making FAT* ’20, January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain
different predictions made by the same model, instead of calibrating
human perception of different models.
As we discussed, calibrating trust for individual predictions is
especially important in AI-assisted decision making scenarios. We
note several recent studies employed similar AI-assisted decision-
making setups and studied how various model related information
impacts trust and decision outcome [17, 27, 29, 30, 32]. Multiple
studies examined the effect of accuracy information [17, 30, 32], and
found people to increase their trust in the model when high accu-
racy indicators are displayed, reflected both in subjective reporting
and more consistent choices with the model’s recommendations.
Closest to ours is the work by Lai and Tan [17], where they studied
the effect of showing prediction (in contrast to baseline without
AI assistance), accuracy and multiple types of explanation for AI
assisted decision-making in a deception-detection scenario. They
found that all these features increased people’s trust, measured
as acceptance of the AI’s recommendation as the final decision,
and also the decision accuracy. However, a caveat in interpreting
the results is that the AI used in this task surpasses human perfor-
mance by a large margin (87% compared to 51%), so any features
that manifest the AI’s advantage could potentially increase people’s
willingness to trust the AI, which by default would improve the
decision outcome. In fact, observing the results reported by cor-
rect versus incorrect model decisions, all these features increased
participants willingness to accept the AI’s prediction regardless
of its correctness, which is evidence that they are ineffective in
calibrating trust.
3 EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECT OF SHOWING AI
CONFIDENCE SCORE
In the first experiment, we tested the following hypotheses with a
case study of AI-assisted prediction task:
• Hypothesis 1 (H1): Showing AI confidence score improves
trust calibration in AI such that people trust the AI more in
cases where the AI has higher confidence.
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): Showing AI confidence score improves
accuracy of AI-assisted predictions.
H2 is based on the assumption that if H1 holds, then humans
may be able to adopt the AI’s recommendation at the right time
and avoid following wrong recommendations. In addition, we also
explored the following research questions:
• Research Question 1 (RQ1): How does showing AI’s predic-
tion versus not showing, affect trust, accuracy of AI-assisted
predictions, and the effect of confidence score on trust cali-
bration?
While the former is a commonAI-assisted decision-making scenario
where the AI gives direct recommendations, the latter represents
a scenario where the human has to make blind delegation to the
AI without seeing its output. Blind delegation can happen in real-
world scenarios where delegation has to happen beforehand, or
when the AI decisions have latency. We were also interested in it as
a stricter test of trust and trust calibration, following the setup used
in Bansal et al. [2] to test mental modeling of error boundaries.
• Research Question (RQ2): How does knowing to have more
domain knowledge than the AI affect humans’ trust, accuracy
of AI-assisted predictions, and the effect of confidence score
on trust calibration?
To achieve these goals, we designed a prediction task in which
participants could achieve comparable performance to an AI model.
This task served as the foundation for both the first and the second
experiment.
3.1 Experimental Design
3.1.1 Participants. We recruited 72 participants from Amazon Me-
chanical Turk for this first experiment. 19 participants were women,
and 2 declined to state their gender. 16 participants were between
Age 18 and 29, 32 between Age 30 and 39, 15 between Age 40 and
49, and 9 over Age 50.
3.1.2 Task and Materials. We designed an income prediction task
where a participant was asked to predict whether a person’s an-
nual income would exceed $50K based on some demographic and
job information. The data used for the task was the 1994 Census
Data published as the Adult Data Set in UCI Machine Learning
Repository [10]. The entire dataset has 48,842 instances of surveyed
persons, each described by 14 attributes. These people’s annual
income, recorded as a binary value indicating above/below $50K,
was used as the ground truth for assessing the participants’ pre-
diction accuracy. ML models are trained based on a sample of the
dataset to make recommendations to the participants. We selected
8 most important features out of the 14 attributes (as determined
by the feature importance values of a Gradient Boosting Decision
Tree model over all the data) as features for the models, and as
profile features shown to the participants in the prediction trials.
The model was trained based on a 70% random split of the original
data set, while the prediction trials given to the participants were
drawn from the remaining 30%. Each prediction trial was shown
to the participants with the eight profile attributes in a table like
Figure 1.
We intended to create a setup close to real-world AI-assisted
decision scenarios where the humans have comparable domain
knowledge with the AI and are motivated to optimize the decision
outcome. We took two measures to improve the ecological validity.
First, the decision performance was linked to monetary bonus,
with a reward of 5 cents if the final prediction was correct and a
loss of 2 cents if otherwise (in addition to a base pay of $3). Prior
research showed that such a reward design is effective in motivating
participants to optimize the decision outcome [2, 31]
Second, since MTurk workers were unlikely familiar with this
task, we boosted their domain knowledge and performance by a
training task (detailed in Section 3.1.4) and an additional piece of
information—the third column in Figure 1 showing the chance a
person with that attribute-value earning income above $50K on
a scale of 0 to 10. This chance number was calculated from the
training dataset based on the percentages of people with the corre-
sponding attribute-value earning income above 50K. We multiplied
the percentages by 10 and rounded the number since prior work
shows that people understand frequencies better than probabilities
[17]. For example, in Figure 1, the chance value for occupation
indicates that 5 people out of 10 with the occupation of Executive &
Managerial have annual income above 50K. For continuous values
like Age and Years of Education, chance is calculated over a range,
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Figure 1: A screenshot of a profile table shown in the exper-
iment. The table lists eight attribute values and their corre-
sponding chances (out of 10) that a person with the same
attribute value would have income above $50K.
e.g. Age between 45 and 55. The specific range is shown when the
participant hovered the mouse pointer on the chance number.
The chance number can be seen as analogous to learning mate-
rials that experts may have in real-world scenarios. For example,
decision-makers often have access to statistics of historical events.
However, these statistics do not obviate the need for human deci-
sion making to synthesize various information. This is also reflected
in our task in that the chance values only show probabilities condi-
tioned on single attributes, and the participants still had to learn to
combine them to form a prediction based on all attributes.
3.1.3 Design. We designed three experimental factors to evaluate
the effect of showing confidence scores (H1 and H2), as well as to
explore the difference in showing prediction (RQ1) and in scenar-
ios where humans have additional knowledge (RQ2). This 2x2x2
design yields a total of 8 conditions, and we randomly assigned 9
participants to each condition.
Show vs. not show AI confidence. Studying the effect of con-
fidence scores on people’s trust in AI and AI-assisted prediction
outcomes is the main goal of this experiment. Confidence is defined
as the model’s predicted probability for the most likely outcome.
For certain ML models, their predicted event probabilities may devi-
ate substantially from the true outcome probabilities (this is called
poor calibration). We checked our models and found that their
probabilities matched the outcome probabilities very well. Like the
chance number, we stated confidence probabilities as frequencies
in messages like this: "The model’s prediction is correct N times out
of 10 on individuals similar to this one", where N is the rounded
number of confidence probability multiplied by 10.
Show vs. not show AI prediction. We compared a scenario
where human had access to the AI’s prediction to assist their final
decision, versus one where the human had to choose whether to
delegate the task to AI without seeing the prediction. The latter was
a stricter test of people’s trust and trust calibration. In both condi-
tions, feedback were provided on whether each trial was correct or
not, so participants would still experience the AI’s performance in
conditions where the AI’s predictions were not shown.
Full vs. partial model. We explored whether it made a differ-
ence when people knew they had access to more information than
the AI. This situation is common in real-world AI-assisted decision
making, as human experts often posses domain knowledge that
is not captured by the data to train the AI. For this purpose, we
trained a second partial model without the most important attribute,
marital status. Note our focus was not to test human trust on an
inferior model, as the accuracy of the partial model (83%) was only
slightly less than that of the full model (84%) when evaluated on a
reserved 20% test set. Instead, we were interested in the effect of
subjectively knowing to have more domain knowledge than the AI
on people’s trust and decision-making. Therefore, for participants
assigned to the partial model condition, we explicitly told them the
model was not considering the martial status attribute, and further
highlighted the point by distinguishing the marital status attribute
in the profile table with a description text "extra information for
you".
Since the focus of this research was on calibration of trust for
cases where AI prediction was more or less reliable, instead of
random sampling, we opted for stratified sampling of cases across
different confidence levels. This would increase the number of
cases where the AI was less certain about, and allow us to bet-
ter compare the effect of studied features on cases with different
certainty levels. The confidence scores of the model for a binary
prediction ranged from 50% to 100%. We divided this range into five
bins, each covers a 10% range, and randomly sampled 8 trials from
each bin for a participant. The order of these trials was randomized.
3.1.4 Procedure. Upon accepting the task on Amazon Mechanical
Turk, participants were brought to our experimental website. They
were asked to first give their consent, then read the instruction
about the experiment, including the goal of the task and how to
read the profile table. The instruction was tailored for the condition
the participants were assigned to.
Next, they were given 20 training trials to practice. In each train-
ing trial, after participants gave their predictions, they were shown
the actual income category of that person as well as the AI’s pre-
diction, so that they could learn from the feedback and assess the
AI’s accuracy for different cases. They were also shown the AI’s
confidence level if they were assigned to the with-confidence condi-
tions. After finishing all training trials, participants were told their
accuracy and the model’s accuracy for the last 10 training trials.
They then proceeded to the 40 task trials, where they were asked
to make their own prediction first. They were then shown the
version of AI information (with/without confidence, with/without
prediction) depending on which condition they were assigned to.
Then the participants were asked to choose their own or themodel’s
prediction as their final prediction. Finally, a feedback message
was shown about whether the participant and the model were
correct. In the with-prediction conditions, if the participant’s own
prediction agreed with the AI’s prediction, we automatically took
that prediction as the final prediction. A 10-second count down
was imposed on each trial before the prediction submission button
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was enabled, encouraging participants to pay more attention in
each decision. After the 40 task trials, participants completed a
demographic survey.
As discussed, participants received a base pay of $3 in addition
to the performance-based bonus payment (plus 5 cents if correct
and minus 2 cents if wrong). On average, each participant received
$1.16 bonus, and a total of $4.16 compensation for completing the
half-hour long experiment.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Trust. Prior work suggests that subjective self-reported trust
may not be a reliable indicator for trusting behaviors [16, 29], which
are what ultimately matter in AI-assisted decision tasks. Therefore,
following recent studies [17, 27, 30], we measured participants’
trust in the AI by two behavioral indicators:
1) Switch percentage, the percentage of trials in which the par-
ticipant decided to use the AI’s prediction as their final prediction.
In conditions where the AI’s prediction was shown, it was the
percentage of trials using the AI’s prediction among trials where
participants and the AI disagreed. In conditions where the AI’s
prediction was not shown, it was the percentage of trials in which
participants chose to delegate the prediction to the AI among all
trials.
2) Agreement percentage, the percentage of trials in which the
participant’s final prediction agreed with the AI’s prediction.
The main difference between the two measures was that in the
with-prediction conditions, the agreement percentage would count
the trials in which the participant’s and the AI’s predictions agreed
and automatically counted as the final decision; whereas the switch
percentage would only consider cases where they disagreed and
had to make an intentional act of switching. Therefore, we consider
switch percentage to be a stricter measure of trust, even though
agreement percentage was used in prior research [17].
Figure 2 shows the switch percentage across the prediction and
confidence factors. The result that the orange error bars (w/ confi-
dence conditions) are higher than the green error bars (w/o con-
fidence conditions) indicates that the participants switched to the
AI’s predictions (or decided to use AI in the without-prediction
conditions) more often when the AI’s confidence scores were dis-
played. A four factor ANOVA, confidence × prediction × model
completeness × model confidence level, confirmed that the main
effect of showing confidence scores was significant, F (1, 64) = 4.64,
p = .035.
The other two factors, prediction and model completeness, did
not have any significant main effect or interaction, partially answer-
ing RQ1 and RQ2. As can be seen in Figure 2, showing prediction
did not affect switch percentages significantly, F (1, 64) = 0.217,
p = .643. The insignificant effect of model completeness, F (1, 64) =
0.07, p = .792, suggests that participants did not distrust the partial
model. Given that the two models had similar accuracy, participants
acted rationally.
Figure 3 further examines how showing confidence calibrated
trust for cases of different confidence levels. The figure shows that
when the AI’s confidence level was between 50% and 80%, there
was not much difference between with- and without-confidence
conditions. In fact, participants seemed to trust the model less
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Figure 2: Switch percentage, measured as how often partic-
ipants chose the AI’s predictions as their final predictions,
across confidence and prediction conditions. The dots indi-
cate the mean percentages. All error bars in this and subse-
quent graphs show +/- one standard error.
when AI confidence was shown and was less than 60%, But when
the AI’s confidence level was high—above 80%—participants’ trust
was significantly enhanced by seeing the confidence scores. This
calibration of trust was confirmed by a statistically significant in-
teraction between showing confidence and the AI’s confidence
level, F (4, 256) = 15.8, p < .001. Further, when the AI confidence
score was not shown, participants’ trust was generally maintained
around the same level across trials of all confidence levels. This was
confirmed by an ANOVA on the without-confidence conditions:
main effect of confidence level was not significant, F (4, 128) = 1.84,
p = .126.
To answer RQ1, the trust calibration effect by showing confi-
dence score held regardless of whether the model prediction was
shown. In other words, high confidence scores encouraged partici-
pants to delegate the decision task to the AI even without seeing
its predictions. This was confirmed by the insignificant three-way
interaction between confidence, prediction, and confidence level,
F (4, 256) = 0.266, p = .899.
A similar pattern was observed in the other trust measure, agree-
ment percentage, as shown in Figure 4. When the confidence score
was shown, the difference in the agreement percentage between
high-confidence levels and low-confidence levels became more
pronounced. The calibration effect of confidence score on the agree-
ment percentage, as indicated by the interaction between con-
fidence and confidence levels, was significant, F (4, 256) = 3.82,
p = .005. Similarly, this calibration effect held in scenarios of show-
ing and not showing AI prediction, F (4, 256) = 0.331, p = .857. H1
was thus fully supported.
3.2.2 Accuracy. During the experiment, we collected three types
of predictions: (a) participants’ own predictions before they saw
any information from the AI, (b) the AI’s predictions, and (c) the
participants’ final prediction after seeing AI information, which we
call AI-assisted prediction. We measured the accuracy for each type
of prediction. On average, the participants’ own accuracy was 65%,
with only 14 of 72 participants under 60%, while the AI accuracy
was 75% (note this number is lower thanmodel accuracy on test data
because of stratified sampling for experiment trials). These accuracy
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Figure 3: Switch percentage across five confidence levels and
various conditions.
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Figure 4: Agreement percentage, measured as how often par-
ticipants agree with the model’s prediction, across confi-
dence levels and various conditions.
numbers did not show statistically significant variations across
experimental conditions. Thus, in our task, AI had an advantage
over the humans but not by much. This is in contrast to [17] where
the humans performed substantially worse than the AI (by 37%).
After confirming that displaying confidence both improved over-
all trust and helped calibrate trust with confidence levels, we inves-
tigated whether this translated to improvement in the accuracy of
the AI-assisted predictions. Figure 5 shows this AI-assisted accuracy
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Figure 5: Accuracy of the human andAI-assisted predictions
across conditions.
across conditions. It suggests that there was no significant differ-
ence in AI-assisted accuracy across the prediction and confidence
conditions. Indeed, an ANOVA showed that only the AI confidence
level (F (4, 256) = 79.6, p < .001) and its interaction with model
completeness (F (4, 256) = 2.95, p = .021) had significant effect.
Furthermore, we also analyzed the difference between AI-assisted
accuracy and AI accuracy, and none of the factors showed signifi-
cant effects. We originally expected that the AI-assisted prediction
(i.e. human-AI joint decision) would be more accurate than the AI
alone when the AI confidence was low, but that did not turn out to
be true.
The fact that showing confidence improved trust and trust cali-
bration but failed to improve the AI-assisted accuracy is puzzling,
and it rejects our H2. This phenomenon could be explained by
the correlation between model decision uncertainty and human
decision uncertainty, because trials where the model prediction had
low confidence were also more challenging for humans. This can
be seen in Figure 6 that the humans were less accurate than AI
across all confidence levels, although the difference is smaller in the
low confidence trials. Therefore, even though showing confidence
encouraged participants to trust the AI more in high-confidence
zone, the number of trials in which the human and the AI disagreed
in these cases were low to begin with, while in the low-confidence
zone, human’s predictions were not better substitutes for AI’s. A
caveat to interpret the results here is that if the correlation between
human and model uncertainty decreases, for example if the human
expert and the model each has a unique set of knowledge, it is
possible that better calibration of trust with the model certainty
could lead to improved AI-assisted decisions.
In summary, results of Experiment 1 showed that displaying
confidence score improved trust calibration (H1 supported) and
increased people’s willingness to rely on AI’s prediction in high-
confidence cases. This trust calibration effect held in AI-assisted
decision scenarios where the AI’s recommendation was shown, and
in scenarios where people had to make blind delegation without
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Figure 6: Difference between human and AI accuracy across
confidence levels.
seeing the AI’s recommendation (RQ1). However, in this case study,
trust calibration did not translate into improvement in AI-assisted
decision outcome (H2 rejected), potentially because there was not
enough complementary knowledge for people to draw on.While we
explored a scenario where participants knew they had additional
knowledge that the AI did not have access to, it did not make
significant difference in the AI-assisted prediction task (RQ2)
4 EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF LOCAL
EXPLANATION
The second experiment examined the effect of local explanations.
It had the same setup as Experiment 1, but instead of showing
confidence scores, we showed local explanations for each AI predic-
tion. The main hypothesis we wanted to test was that: because local
explanation is suggested to help people judge whether to trust a par-
ticular prediction [28], and it could potentially expose uncertainty
underlying an AI prediction, showing explanation could support
trust calibration (H3) and improve AI-assisted predictions (H4).
4.1 Experiment Setup
We developed a visual explanation feature like the one in Figure 7.
This visualization explains a particular model prediction by how
each attribute contributes to the model’s prediction. The contribu-
tion values were generated using a state-of-the-art local explanation
technique called Shapley method [19].
Experiment 2 was carried out only under the full-model, with-
prediction condition. We only tested the full-model condition be-
cause the first experiment did not show significant effect of the
model completeness. We only tested the with-prediction condition,
because even if the prediction was not shown, participants could
still derive them from the explanation graphs—if the sum of the
orange bars is longer than the sum of the blue bars, the model
predicts income above 50K and vice versa.
Nine participants were recruited for Experiment 2. Four of them
were women. One participant was between Age 18-29, four between
Age 30 and 39, two between 40 and 49, and two above 50.
4.2 Results
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test the effect of local explanation
on people’s trust in the AI and the AI-assisted decision outcomes,
Figure 7: A screenshot of the explanation shown for a par-
ticular trial. Participants were told that orange bars indicate
that the corresponding attributes suggest higher likelihood
of income above 50K, whereas blue bars indicate higher like-
lihood of income below 50K. The light blue bar at the bottom
indicates the base chance—a person with average values in
all attributes is unlikely to have income above 50K.
as compared to baseline condition and the effect of confidence
scores. Therefore, for the subsequent analysis, we combined the
data collected from this experiment with those from the baseline
and with-confidence condition of Experiment 1 (all conditions are
full-model, with-prediction).
4.2.1 Trust. Figure 8 shows that unlike confidence, explanation did
not seem to affect participants’ trust in the model predictions across
confidence levels. As discussed before, indicated by the orange bars,
showing model confidence encouraged participants to trust the
model more in high-confidence cases (note that the statistics are
not identical to those in Figure 3 because results here only included
data in the full-model, with-prediction condition), but the results for
explanation (blue error bars) did not show such a pattern. Instead,
the switch percentage seemed to stay constant across confidence
levels similar to that in the control condition. Results of an ANOVA
supported these observations: the model information factor (no info
vs. confidence vs. explanation) had a significant effect on the switch
percentage, F (2, 24) = 4.17, p = .028, and its interaction with model
confidence level was also significant, F (8, 96) = 3.81, p < .001. A
Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) post-hoc test showed
that the switch percentage in the confidence condition was signifi-
cantly higher than those in the baseline condition (p=.011) and the
explanation condition (p < .001), but the explanation condition was
not significantly different from the baseline (p = .66).
The agreement percentage showed a similar effect, albeit less
pronounced. As shown in Figure 9, the baseline condition (green)
and the explanation condition (blue) had similar agreement per-
centages, while the with-confidence condition (orange) had higher
percentage when the confidence level was above 70%. Nonetheless,
this effect was not significant on this measure, F (2, 24) = 0.637,
p = .537. Taken together,H3 was rejected as we found no evidence
that showing explanation was more effective in trust calibration
than the baseline.
4.2.2 Accuracy. In Experiment 2, the average Human accuracy
was 63%, while the AI’s accuracy was again 75% due to stratified
sampling. Figure 10 examines the effect of explanation on the accu-
racy of AI-assisted predictions. Similar to Experiment 1, we did not
find any significant difference in AI-assisted accuracy across model
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Figure 8: Switch percentage across confidence levels and
model information conditions.
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Figure 9: Agreement percentage across confidence levels and
model information conditions.
information conditions, F (2, 24) = 0.810, p = .457. If anything,
there was a reverse trend of decreasing the AI-assisted accuracy by
showing explanation. H4 was thus also rejected.
Taken together, the results suggest a lack of effect of local expla-
nations on improving trust calibration and AI-assisted prediction.
Our results appeared to contradict conclusions in Lai and Tan’s
study [17], which showed that explanations could improve peo-
ple’s trust and the joint decision outcome. But a closer look at Lai
and Tan’s results revealed a trend of indiscriminatory increase in
trust (willingness to accept) whether the AI made correct or incor-
rect predictions, suggesting similar conclusion that explanations
are ineffective for trust calibration. However, since in their study
the AI outperformed human by a large margin, this indiscrimina-
tory increase in trust improved the overall decision outcome. It is
l l
l
62%
65%
68%
70%
72%
no info confidence explanationAI
−A
ss
is
te
d 
Pr
ed
ict
io
n 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
l l lno info confidence explanation
Figure 10: Accuracy of the AI-assisted predictions across
conditions.
also possible in that setup explanations could display the superior
capability of the system and more effectively enhance the trust.
In the next section, we discuss the implications of differences in
the AI-assisted decision task setups and the limitations of local
explanations for trust calibration.
5 DISCUSSIONS
We discuss broader implications of this case study for improving
AI-assisted decision-making.
5.1 Mental Model of Error Boundaries
Consistent with prior work on trust calibration for automation [20],
we show that case specific confidence information can improve
trust calibration in AI-assisted decision making scenarios. In these
scenarios, showing confidence is potentially more helpful than
showing model-wide information such as accuracy. Bansal et al. [2]
mentioned that well-calibrated confidence scores can potentially
help people form a good mental model of AI’s error boundaries–
understanding of when the AI is likely to err. We recognize that we
did not measure people’s mental model directly but instead focus-
ing on behavioral manifestation of trust calibration. Developing a
good mental model is indeed a higher target, which requires one to
construct explicit representation of error boundaries. With a good
mental model, one may be able to more efficiently calibrate trust
without the needs to access and comprehend confidence informa-
tion for every prediction. A recent paper by Hoffman et al. [14]
recognizes that forming a good mental model of AI is the key to ef-
fectively appropriating trust and usage. The paper also calls out the
need to develop methods to measure the soundness of users’ mental
model, and suggests references from methods in cognitive psychol-
ogy. Using these methods, future work could examine whether
having access to confidence information could effectively foster a
mental model of error boundaries.
However, showing confidence scores has its drawbacks. It is well
understood that confidence scores are not always well calibrated
in ML classifiers [23]. Also a numeric score may not be interpreted
meaningfully by all people, especially in complex tasks. Moreover,
confidence scores alone may be insufficient to foster a good mental
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model, since it would require people to extract explicit knowledge
from repeated experience. Future work could explore techniques
to provide more explicit description of error boundaries or low-
confidence zones, and study their effect on trust calibration and
AI-assisted decision making.
5.2 Alignment of Human’s and AI’s Error
Boundaries
Our study found little effect of confidence information on improving
AI-assisted decision outcome, even though it improved trust calibra-
tion. A potential reason is that, in our setup, the error boundaries of
human’s and AI’s were largely aligned. In other words, in situations
where the AI was likely to err, the humans were also likely to err.
Participants recruited from Mechanical Turk are not experts in an
income prediction task. We attempted to inject domain knowledge
by providing participants with chance numbers for each feature,
while the model was trained on the same data with the same set
of features. While we explored conditions where the human had
access to an additional key attribute, it might not have created suf-
ficient advantage for the human. We envision in situations where
the AI and the human have complementary error boundaries, trust
calibration may be more effective in improving AI-assisted decision
outcomes. Future work should test this hypothesis.
Results of our study show some discrepancies with prior works,
especially Lai and Tan’s study [17]. We recognize the differences be-
tween the setups. While in our study the human and AI had largely
aligned knowledge and performance, in [17] the humans had sig-
nificantly worse performance in the deception detection task. We
may consider the setup in [17] to be a situation where the human
and the AI not only have unaligned, but also unequal error zones.
These comparisons highlight the problem of generalizability from
studies of AI-assisted decision making tasks without explicitly char-
acterizing or controlling for the human’s performance profile and
its difference from the AI’s. Our results suggest that such character-
ization or experimental control may need to go beyond the overall
performance, but also consider the alignment of error boundaries
between the human and the AI. While how to characterize the level
of error boundary alignment poses an open question, we invite the
research community to consider it in order to collectively produce
unified theories and best practices of AI-assisted decision making.
5.3 Explainability for Trust Calibration
Explainable Artificial Intelligence is a rapidly growing research
discipline [1, 4, 11, 22]. The quest for explainability has its roots in
the growing adoption of high-performance "black-box" AI models,
which spurs public concerns about the safety and ethical usage
of AI. Given such "AI aversion", research has largely embraced ex-
plainability as a potential cure for enhancing trust and usage of AI.
Empirical studies of human-AI interaction also tend to seek vali-
dation of trust enhancement by explainability, albeit with highly
mixed results. But in practice, there are diverse needs for explain-
ability, as captured by [1, 9], including scenarios for ensuring safety
in complex tasks, guarding against discrimination, and improving
user control of AI. In many of these scenarios, one would desire sup-
port for effectively and efficiently identifying errors, uncertainty,
and mismatched objectives of AI, instead of being persuaded to
Figure 11: Screenshots of explanation for cases where the
model had low confidence.
over-trust the system. Therefore, we highlight the problem of trust
calibration and designed a case study to explore whether a popular
local explanation method could support trust calibration.
Unfortunately, we did not find the explanation to create per-
ceivable effect in calibrating trust in AI predictions. This stands in
contrast to the findings of [28] where explanations helped expose
a critical flaw in the model (treating snow as Husky), which could
help the debugging work. We note the difference in our setup–the
classification model may not have obvious flaws in its overall logic
and trust calibrationmay require more than recognizing flaws in the
explanation. Figure 11 lists two examples of explanation shown for
a low-confidence prediction. In theory, prediction confidence could
be inferred by summing the positive and negative contributions
of all attributes. If the sum is close to zero, then the prediction is
not made with confidence. However, we speculate that this method
of inference might not have been obvious for people without ML
training. Instead, one may simply focus on whether the top features
and their contributions are sensible. In these two examples, marital
status is considered as the main reason for the model to predict
higher income. This is a sensible rationale that would frequently
appear in explanations regardless of prediction confidence. It is also
possible that the explanation created information overload [27]
or are simply ignored by some participants. We acknowledge that
some of these problems may be specific to the visual design we
adopted. It is also possible that the underlying explanation algo-
rithm has its limitation in faithfully reflecting prediction certainty.
Nonetheless, our study highlights the importance of studying how
an AI explanation design is perceived by a particular group of users,
for a particular goal.
There are many other explanation methods and techniques, and
it is possible that some are more effective in calibrating trust or
exposing model problems. For example, Dodge et al. [8] compared
the effect of different explanation methods in exposing discrimina-
tion of an unfair model. The study showed that sensitivity based
explanation, which highlights only a small number of features that,
if changed, could "flip" the model’s prediction, is perceived as more
alarming and therefore more effective at calibrating fairness judg-
ment than methods that list the contribution of every feature. A
study conducted by Cai et al. [3] found that comparative expla-
nation, by comparisons with examples in alternative classes, can
lead to better discovery of the limitations of the AI, compared to
normative explanation that describes examples in the intended
class. Although these results imply that some explanation meth-
ods may better serve the goal of trust calibration, we know little
about the mechanism, neither from the algorithmic side on what
makes an explanation technique sensitive to the trustworthiness of
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a model or prediction, nor from the human perception side on what
characteristics of explanations are associated with trust or distrust.
We therefore invite the research community to explore AI ex-
plainability specifically for trust calibration, both at the model level
and the prediction level. As a starting point, explanation methods
and techniques could target a different set of goals in addition to
metrics suggested in the current literature such as faithfulness,
improved human understanding or acceptance [9]. For example,
explanation that could effectively support trust calibration at the
model level should be sensitive to the model performance, while
explanation that support trust calibration at the prediction level
should be sensitive to the prediction uncertainty. Ultimately, trust
resides in human perception and the effect on trust calibration
should be evaluated by having targeted users in the loop. Our study
provides an example of how to conduct such an evaluation for trust
calibration.
6 LIMITATIONS
One limitation of our study is that our participants are not experts in
income prediction. This problem was mitigated by the training task
and the access to statistics of the domain (the chance column). The
fact that participants’ accuracy was only 10% less than the model
trained on a large dataset suggests that these domain-knowledge
enhancement measures were effective. Although it is desirable
to conduct the experiment with real experts, it can be extremely
expensive. Our approach can be considered as "human grounded
evaluation" [9], a valid approach by using lay people as "proxy" to
understand the general behavioral patterns.
Another limitation is that we use a contrived prediction task
where the participants would not be held responsible. We miti-
gated the problem by introducing an outcome based bonus reward,
which prior studies suggest could effectively motivate optimizing
the decision-making. While future study could experiment with
scenarios with more significant real-world impact, we note that
they have to be executed with caution to avoid ethical concerns.
Lastly, themethod thatwe proposed for calibrating trust—showing
model prediction confidence to the decisionmaker—clearly depends
on the model’s predicted probabilities being well calibrated to the
true outcome probabilities. There are certain machine learning
models that do not meet this criterion such as SVM, though this
issue can be potentially addressed through Platt Scaling or Isotonic
Regression [24].
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